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Abstract
This paper employs analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to examine
the costs of achieving pollution reductions under a range of environmental policy instruments
in a second-best setting with pre-existing factor taxes.  We compare the costs and overall
efficiency impacts of emissions taxes, emissions quotas, fuels taxes, performance standards,
and mandated technologies, and explore how costs change with the magnitude of pre-existing
taxes and the extent of pollution abatement.
We find that the presence of distortionary taxes raises the costs of pollution abatement
under each instrument relative to its costs in a first-best world.  This extra cost is an increasing
function of the magnitude of pre-existing tax rates.  For plausible values of pre-existing tax
rates and other parameters, the cost increase for all policies is substantial (35 percent or more).
The impact of pre-existing taxes is particularly large for non-auctioned emissions quotas: here
the cost increase can be several hundred percent.  Earlier work on instrument choice has
emphasized the potential reduction in compliance cost achievable by converting fixed
emissions quotas into tradable emissions permits.  Our results indicate that the regulator's
decision whether to auction or grandfather emissions rights can have equally important cost
impacts.  Similarly, the choice as to how to recycle revenues from environmentally motivated
taxes (whether to return the revenues in lump-sum fashion or via cuts in marginal tax rates)
can be as important to cost as the decision whether the tax takes the form of an emissions tax
or fuel tax, particularly when modest emissions reductions are involved.
In both first- and second-best settings, the cost differences across instruments depend
importantly on the extent of pollution abatement under consideration.  Total abatement costs
differ markedly at low levels of abatement.  Strikingly, for all instruments except the fuel tax
these costs converge to the same value as abatement levels approach 100 percent
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THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF ALTERNATIVE INSTRUMENTS
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN A SECOND-BEST SETTING
Lawrence H. Goulder, Ian W. H. Parry,
Roberton C. Williams III, and Dallas Burtraw1
1.  INTRODUCTION
Environmental policy makers often must choose among alternative instruments for
reducing emissions of pollution.  A number of considerations affect this choice, including
administrative ease, the costs of monitoring and enforcement, the probability distribution of policy
errors in the face of uncertainty, effects on the distribution of income, and political feasibility.2
In recent years another important consideration has emerged: namely, the implications
of pre-existing distortionary taxes (such as income, payroll, and sales taxes) for the costs of
pollution abatement under various instruments.  The potential importance of pre-existing taxes
to environmental policy has been suggested by recent analyses of environmentally-motivated
taxes in a second-best setting.  This work has shown that pre-existing factor (income) taxes
tend to raise the costs of environmental tax initiatives, even when the revenues from
environmental taxes are used to finance cuts in factor taxes.3  A related insight is that the
optimal environmental tax rate in a second-best setting with distortionary taxes is typically
lower than in a first-best world.4
Some recent studies have examined the implications of pre-existing taxes for the
choice between environmental taxes and other environmental policy instruments.5  Parry
(1997) has employed an analytical model to investigate the choice between pollution taxes
and quotas in the presence of distortionary taxes.  Goulder, Parry and Burtraw (1997) and
Parry, Williams, and Goulder (1996) have used analytical and numerical general equilibrium
                                               
1 Lawrence H. Goulder, Stanford University, Resources for the Future, and NBER; Ian W. H. Parry, Energy and
Natural Resources Division, Resources for the Future; Roberton C. Williams III, Stanford University; Dallas
Burtraw, Quality of the Environment Division, Resources for the Future.  The authors gratefully acknowledge
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2 An extensive literature examines how these considerations might influence instrument choice.  See, for
example, Hahn (1986), Nichols (1984), Stavins (1991), and Weitzman (1974).
3 See, for example, Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Parry (1995), Oates (1995), and Goulder (1995a, 1995b).
4 See, for example, Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994), Parry (1995), and Bovenberg and Goulder (1996).
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models to explore this choice.  These studies show that the presence of distortionary taxes
raises the costs of both pollution taxes and pollution quotas, and raises the costs of (non-
auctioned) quotas disproportionately.  The latter two studies indicate that the extent to which
pre-existing taxes put quotas at a disadvantage depends importantly on the extent of pollution
abatement: at incremental amounts of abatement, the quota's relative disadvantage is largest,
and at 100 percent abatement, its relative disadvantage disappears.
Two welfare effects underlie these results.  By driving up the price of (polluting)
goods relative to leisure, environmental taxes and quotas tend to compound the factor-market
distortions created by pre-existing taxes, thereby producing a negative welfare impact termed
the tax-interaction effect.  At the same time, environmental taxes whose revenues are recycled
through cuts in marginal tax rates reduce the distortions caused by the pre-existing taxes,
which contributes to a positive welfare impact.  This revenue-recycling effect partly offsets
the tax-interaction effect.  While both taxes and quotas produce the costly tax-interaction
effect, (non-auctioned) quotas cannot exploit the revenue-recycling effect.  These studies
show that the quota's inability to exploit the revenue-recycling effect puts the quota policy at a
disadvantage relative to environmental taxes.  Indeed, the failure to enjoy the revenue-
recycling effect may reverse the sign of the overall efficiency impact (i.e., net benefits)!6   In
this connection, Parry, Williams, and Goulder (1996) estimate that reducing carbon emissions
through carbon quotas will be efficiency-reducing if the marginal environmental benefits
from carbon abatement are below $25 per ton.
A recent paper by Fullerton and Metcalf (1997) expands the domain of instrument
choice by considering not only taxes and quotas but also a "technology restriction" policy
(that is, a policy that constrains the ratio of emissions to labor input).7  Using an analytical
model that examines the impacts of initial, incremental pollution abatement, the authors find
that incremental abatement involves zero cost under the technology restriction policy, but
involves strictly positive costs under the pollution quota.  Their paper relates the cost
difference to scarcity rents -- the quota generates scarcity rents while the technology
restriction does not.  This result is consistent with the fact that for incremental abatement, the
pollution quota produces a sizeable (non-infinitesimal) tax-interaction effect, while the
technology restriction does not.
The present paper builds on prior work by considering a wide range of alternative
policy instruments and examining both incremental and large amounts of pollution abatement.
Using a consistent analytical and numerical general equilibrium framework, we examine
                                               
6 Of course, new sources of revenues may be used in ways other than to cut marginal rates of existing taxes.
They may be used, for example, to increase government spending, to finance lump-sum tax reductions or
transfers, or to reduce the budget deficit.  (For a public choice perspective on this see Becker and Mulligan,
1997.)  These different methods of recycling the revenues can have very different efficiency consequences.  In
the case where emissions tax revenues are returned as lump-sum tax cuts, the revenue-recycling effect does not
materialize and there is no offset to the tax-interaction effect.
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emissions taxes, emissions quotas, fuels taxes, performance standards, and mandated
technologies.  Our focus is on how the costs and overall efficiency impacts of the different
instruments are affected by pre-existing taxes and the extent of pollution abatement.
We abstract from some other considerations that may affect instrument choice, such as
heterogeneity in firms' abatement cost schedules and information problems faced by regulators.
We find that the presence of distortionary taxes raises the costs of pollution abatement
under each instrument relative to its costs in a first-best world.  This extra cost is directly
related to the magnitude of pre-existing tax rates, and for plausible pre-existing tax rates and
parameters the cost increase is substantial (35 percent or more).  The impact of pre-existing
taxes is particularly large for (non-auctioned) emissions quotas, where the cost increase can
be several hundred percent.  The cost differences across instruments depend importantly on
the extent of pollution abatement under consideration: while abatement costs differ
substantially at low levels of abatement, costs for all policies except the fuel tax converge to
the same value as the level of abatement approaches 100 percent.  We discuss the overall
efficiency implications of these results under a range of scenarios for environmental benefits.
Our results have some important implications for policy.  Economists have long
argued that tradable emissions permits and emissions taxes are more cost-effective than
performance standards, technology mandates, and other traditional forms of regulation (see,
for example, Cropper and Oates, 1992).  These arguments have had an important influence on
policy making in recent years.  For example, a (non-auctioned) tradable emissions program
was implemented in 1990 to reduce sulfur emissions, and a similar program is being proposed
to reduce U.S. carbon emissions.  Our results suggest that tradable emissions permits will only
produce substantial cost savings over performance standards or technology mandates if the
permits are auctioned rather than given out free and the revenues used to cut other taxes.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents an analytical model that reveals the
different efficiency impacts of the policy instruments.  This model is extended in later sections to
introduce more realism and gauge the empirical importance of these differences in efficiency.
Section 3 presents the extended model, which is solved numerically.  Section 4 provides results
from simulations with the extended model.  The final section offers conclusions.
2. THE ANALYTICAL MODEL
This section uses an analytical model to compare the gross costs of environmental
policy instruments in the presence of distortionary taxes.  Subsections A-E lay out the model
assumptions and discuss the general equilibrium impacts of the different policy instruments.
Subsection F examines the extent to which pre-existing tax distortions magnify the costs
under the different policies.
A. Model Assumptions
We develop a static model in which a representative household enjoys utility from a
polluting consumption good (X), a non-polluting consumption good (Y) and non-market timeGoulder, Parry, Williams, and Burtraw RFF 98-22
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of the polluting good and the same output-substitution effect.  Thus, their costs converge to
the same value.32  Similarly, the technology mandate differs from the performance standard in
that it does not fully exploit the input substitution effect, but the importance of that effect also
falls at higher levels of emissions reduction.  Thus, the costs of the technology mandate also
converge to the same value as the costs of the other policies.
B. The Significance of Pre-Existing Taxes
Figure 2b shows the general equilibrium costs of the policy instruments in a second-
best setting with tL = 0.4 initially.  These costs are expressed relative to the costs of the
emissions tax in a first-best world.  By comparing results of Figure 2b with those in Figure 2a,
one can observe the impact of pre-existing taxes.33
For the emissions tax, second-best costs exceed first-best costs by a constant factor of
1.35 -- together the tax-interaction and revenue-recycling effects raise the overall cost of the
emissions tax by 35 percent.34  For the emissions quota, interactions with the tax system raise
the overall costs by a larger amount, reflecting the fact that the quota does not generate a
revenue-recycling effect to counteract the tax-interaction effect.  The differences in costs are
most striking for modest levels of abatement.  For emissions reductions below 23 percent, the
cost of the quota is more than double that of the tax.  However, under the emissions tax the
marginal revenue-recycling effect declines with the level of emissions reductions as the tax
base is eroded.  At 100 percent abatement, no emissions tax revenues are raised and there is
no revenue-recycling effect.  Hence at this level of abatement the total costs of the emissions
tax and quota are equivalent.35
The second-best costs of the performance standard, technology mandate and fuel tax
exceed those of the emissions tax by the same proportions as in Figure 2a; pre-existing taxes
                                               
32 Figure 2a also shows that the relative inefficiency of the fuel tax is larger, the greater the extent of emissions
reduction.  This is not necessarily a general result, but arises because of our assumed functional forms.  The
marginal abatement cost function is linear, while the marginal costs of input- and output-substitution are convex.
Consequently the relative importance of the abatement effect increases with the level of emissions reduction
under the emissions tax.  This implies a greater relative cost under the fuel tax, which does not exploit the
abatement effect.
33 The impact of pre-existing taxes is not necessarily captured entirely by the magnitudes of the tax-interaction
and revenue-recycling effects.  The reason is that pre-existing taxes conceivably could affect primary costs (by
altering relative prices and thereby influencing the extent to which abatement, input-substitution, and output-
substitution effects are utilitized).  However, our numerical simulations indicate that primary costs change very
little when pre-existing taxes are introduced.
34 The results above are very close to those predicted by the analytical model.  Similar empirical results for
sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide emissions abatement were obtained by Goulder et al. (1997) and Parry et al.
(1996), respectively.
35 Note that the numerical model incorporates an indirect revenue-recycling effect from the taxation of quota rents.
This equals 40 percent of the revenue-recycling effect under the emissions tax.  Thus, the difference between the tax
and quota is smaller than would be predicted by the analytical model, which ignores the taxation of quota rents.Goulder, Parry, Williams, and Burtraw RFF 98-22
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raise the costs of all these policies by about 35 percent.  The net impact of the tax-interaction
and revenue-recycling effects is proportional to primary cost.36
Figure 2b's results for the relative costs of the emissions quota are particularly striking.
Four points deserve emphasis.  First, only the quota policy has positive marginal costs at
initial, incremental abatement.  The emissions tax has zero marginal costs at initial abatement,
so the cost-ratio associated with the quota is infinite.  For all the other instruments, at this
initial increment the tax-interaction and revenue-recycling effects either are zero or they
exactly offset each other, so that marginal costs are zero.37  Thus, for these other policies, the
ratio of costs is finite at initial, incremental abatement.
Second, in this analysis the efficiency consequences of the quota depend importantly
on the fact that the quota is not auctioned, which means that the revenue-recycling effect is
not exploited.  If, in contrast, quotas were auctioned and the revenues used to finance cuts in
the marginal rates of pre-existing taxes, the efficiency impacts of the quota would be the same
as that of the emissions tax.
Third, these results bear importantly on the evaluation of tradable permits systems.  A
key attraction of such systems is that they help achieve a more efficient allocation of abatement
effort by promoting an equilibrium in which producers' marginal costs of abatement are equal.
Typical estimates indicate that allowing for trades can reduce costs of compliance by 30
percent or more relative to the costs of a system with fixed emissions quotas (that is, with no
trades).38  Figure 2b's results indicate that second-best considerations can have an equal or
                                               
36 For the two tax instruments, this proportionality occurs because the revenue-recycling effect exactly offsets
the portion of the tax-interaction effect resulting from the charge on residual emissions, leaving a net second-best
effect that is proportional to the first-best cost of the tax, as discussed in Section 2.  The technology mandate and
performance standard do not charge firms for residual emissions; hence under these policies the increase in price
of final output only depends on the costs of abatement and input substitution -- the first-best costs.  Thus, in
these cases, the tax-interaction effect itself is proportional to the first-best cost of the policy.  Since these policies
do not involve a revenue-recycling effect, the overall second-best effect is proportional as well.
37In the case of the performance standard and technology mandate, the tax-interaction and revenue-recycling
effects are both zero at initial abatement.  Thus the marginal cost curves emerge from the origin.  A similar result
was obtained by Fullerton and Metcalf (1997) under their technology-restriction policy, which resembles the
performance standard considered here.  The quota policy's marginal cost curve does not emerge from the origin
because it has an efficiency loss from the tax-interaction effect and no offsetting revenue-recycling effect.  There
are other cases under which the net impact of the tax-interaction and revenue-recycling effects is strictly positive
at incremental abatement.  These include the case where the government introduces an emissions tax and returns
the revenues in lump-sum fashion, and the case where the government policy increases the returns to a perfectly
inelastic factor of production (Williams, 1997, and, in the context of trade policy, Williams, 1998a).  What is
common to all these cases is that the government policy has effectuated a lump-sum transfer to the private sector,
either by generating untaxed scarcity rents (the case emphasized by Fullerton and Metcalf), by providing explicit
lump-sum transfers, or by generating additional rents to fixed factors.  In a world with distortionary taxes, lump-
sum transfers from the government to the private sector are costly in efficiency terms because the government
ultimately must finance such transfers through distortionary taxes.
38 Tietenberg (1985) surveyed 11 studies, with costs under command and control estimated to be over six times
larger on average as costs under the ideal least-cost approach.  Numerous other studies have found significant
cost savings from tradable pollution permit programs, although costs under these programs typically exceed the
theoretical minimum by a substantial amount, in part because of flaws in program design (Hahn, 1989).Goulder, Parry, Williams, and Burtraw RFF 98-22
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cost of the fuel tax remains unchanged in this scenario, since it does not utilize the abatement
effect.  Hence this policy's relative cost is now lower.41
In Figure 3b (see end of document) we quadruple the value of the substitution
elasticity between consumer goods to increase the relative importance of the output-
substitution effect.  This has very little impact on the position of the curves relative to those in
Figure 2b because it is still the case that only a small fraction of the emissions reduction is
due to the output substitution effect.  Indeed, for all major pollutants, the bulk of emission
reduction comes from reducing the emissions-output ratio, rather than by substituting away
from pollution-related goods in consumption.
In Figure 3c we quadruple the elasticity of substitution in production, which increases
the importance of the input-substitution effect.  This has virtually no impact on the relative
cost of the emissions quota or performance standard.  The technology mandate, however,
derives relatively little of its emissions reductions from the input-substitution effect, so its
cost relative to the emissions tax rises, even though its absolute cost falls slightly.  In contrast,
the relative cost of the fuel tax falls because it relies on the input substitution effect much
more than the emissions tax does.
D. Efficiency Impacts
We now consider the net efficiency impacts -- environmental benefits less economic
costs -- of the different policies.  Here we posit a range of values for the (constant) marginal
benefits from pollution abatement (or marginal damages from pollution), and calculate the
optimal level of abatement and net efficiency gain associated with each posited value.
Figure 4a (see end of document) displays, in a first-best world, the ratio of the
maximum efficiency gain under each policy to the efficiency gain under the optimal
emissions tax.  Figure 4b offers complementary information: the ratio of the maximum gain
under each policy in a second-best world to the maximum gain from an emissions tax in a
first-best world.  Thus, the differences in the ratios for figures 4b and 4a reveal the
significance of pre-existing taxes.  Along the horizontal axis of both graphs we consider a
range of values for marginal pollution damages.  The triangles, circles, and rectangles on each
graph respectively show, for each policy, the level of marginal damages corresponding to
optimal emissions reductions of 25, 50, and 100 percent.
In the first-best case, the initial marginal cost for each policy is zero, and thus there is
scope for an efficiency gain so long as marginal damages from pollution (marginal benefits
from abatement) are positive.  The potential efficiency gains are largest under the emissions
tax and quota, as expected, since these policies have the lowest primary costs.  The policies
with higher primary costs produce lower potential efficiency gains.
The level of marginal damages necessary to justify a given level of emissions
reduction also varies among the different policies.  Marginal costs of abatement are lowest for
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the emissions tax and quota, so a given level of emissions reduction is justified at a lower
level of marginal benefits.  The other policies have higher marginal abatement costs, and thus
require higher levels of marginal damages to justify a given level of emissions reduction.
When marginal damages justify a 100 percent emissions reduction under the other policies,
the efficient level of emissions reduction under the fuel tax is less than 50 percent.
In the second-best case shown in Figure 4b, the same principles apply, but since the
gross costs of all policies are higher, the potential welfare gains are substantially lower.
Under the emissions quota, second-best considerations have the most profound impact on
marginal abatement costs and, consequently, the welfare gains.  In fact, the quota cannot
produce any welfare gain unless marginal damages exceed a certain threshold value.  This
stems from the fact that in the second-best case, the initial marginal cost of the quota is
positive, in contrast with the other policy instruments examined here.
As in the first-best situation, in a second-best world the efficient level of emissions
reduction associated with given values for marginal environmental damages varies across
policies.  The sharpest differences are between the fuel tax and other policies.  At values for
marginal damages that justify nearly 100 percent emissions reduction for the other policies,
the optimal emissions reduction under the fuel tax is only about 25 percent.  This reflects the
fact that marginal abatement costs rise most sharply under the fuel tax policy.
E. Further Sensitivity Analysis
Table 3 summarizes the sensitivity of the numerical results to a range of values for
important parameters.  Here we vary the compensated and uncompensated labor supply
elasticities, the initial labor tax rate, and the curvature parameter for the abatement cost
function.  Table 3 displays for different parameter values the ratio in a second-best setting of
the total cost under each policy to the total cost under the emissions tax.  We calculate this
ratio at three different levels of abatement: 25, 50, and 75 percent of baseline emissions.
Changing the uncompensated labor supply elasticity has very little effect on the
relative costs of the different policies (though the absolute costs change substantially).
Changing the compensated labor supply elasticity shows a similar result for all policies but
the quota.  The relative cost of the quota is significantly higher with a larger compensated
labor supply elasticity, and significantly lower for a smaller elasticity.  This parallels a result
obtained in Goulder et al. (1997), where a change in the uncompensated elasticity has similar
impacts on the costs of an emissions tax and a quota, while a change in the compensated
elasticity only affects the costs of the quota.42
Changing the pre-existing labor tax rate also has a significant effect on the relative cost
of the quota, while leaving the relative costs of the other policies essentially unchanged.  A
higher pre-existing labor tax causes the second-best effects to be larger.  For all policies but the
quota, the net effect of the revenue-raising and tax-interaction effects is simply proportional to
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Indeed, for all of the instruments except the fuel tax, the costs of abatement converge as the
level of abatement approaches 100 percent.
Some limitations in the present study deserve attention.  First, our analysis does not
incorporate heterogeneity among producers in abatement costs or other production-related
costs.  The significance of heterogeneity extends beyond the issue, discussed above, of the
attractiveness of allowing trades in emissions rights.  Heterogeneity augments the information
burdens faced by regulators, and consequently implies that mandated technologies will tend to
be less efficient than suggested here, because regulators will have a difficult time discerning
what technology is most appropriate.  In addition, heterogeneity implies that many forms of
regulation will involve serious costs of standard-setting, monitoring and enforcement.  To the
extent that it is easier, for example, to monitor fuels or the use of mandated equipment than it
is to monitor emissions, the fuel tax and mandated technology would enjoy an advantage over
other policies.  Thus, heterogeneous production and the associated information problems
produce additional cost considerations that could importantly affect the relative attractiveness
of the policies we have considered.44
Second, this study concentrates solely on efficiency issues.  Clearly, a comprehensive
evaluation of alternative policy instruments must also take account of distributional impacts.
Indeed, some would maintain that political feasibility is influenced far more by distributional
concerns than by efficiency calculations.  Future work that integrates efficiency and
distributional issues in a second-best context may provide additional useful and highly
practical policy insights.
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Integrating the terms in the current variation of (2.10B) between 0 and tE, making use
of the above expressions, and using the shorter expression for dW
A+dW
O, we obtain:
2 / E t W W E
O A D = D + D ; ) ( 0 E E t M W E
R D - ¢ = D ; ) 2 / ( 0 E E t M W E
I D - ¢ = D   (A.16)
where  E E E - = D 0  is the reduction in emissions.  The first term is the familiar welfare loss
triangle from the reduction in emissions.  The second term is the welfare gain from revenue
recycling, equal to emissions tax revenues times the marginal excess burden of taxation.  The
third term is the tax-interaction effect.
The formula in (2.13B) is easily obtained from (A.16). Similarly, (2.11C) is easily
obtained by excluding the revenue-recycling effect.  Following the analogous steps as above
for the fuel tax yields:
2 / X t W X
O D = D ; ) ( 0 X X t M W X
R D - ¢ = D ; ) 2 / ( 0 X X t M W X
I D - ¢ = D   (A.17)
Hence
M
W
W W W
O
I R O
¢ + =
D
D + D - D
1
For the CAC policy, we now approximate the primary costs by  X a c ) ( ; that is, we
ignore the second-order welfare loss from the reduction in final output.  This is reasonable for
modest emissions reductions since there is no charge on residual emissions and thus the
impact on product prices is "small."  For the tax-interaction effect, we use the same formula
as for the fuel tax, except that the increase in price of X is now c(a) rather than tX.  Thus the
ratio of second-best to first-best costs in (2.11D) is easily obtained.0
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